South Florida Car Accident Law Blog

We've talked in a previous blog post about how Florida law generally presumes that the rear driver in a rear-end car accident is responsible for the crash. The presumption is an effective legal tool for a person who has been injured in a rear-end accident. As the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida explains in Arce v. Mullane, however, a person suing for such injury cannot simply rely on the presumption. He or she must also present factual evidence in support of the claim.

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident with the defendant in 2010. According to her version of the incident, the plaintiff was stopped at a red light when she was rear-ended by the defendant's car. She sued the defendant for negligence and later filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that there were no material questions of fact outstanding. The plaintiff further claimed that she was entitled to judgment in her favor based on Florida common law, which presumes that the back driver in a rear-end accident is responsible for the crash.

As the District Court explained, however, the plaintiff could not simply rely on her claim that she was rear-ended and the negligence presumption in order to succeed in the action. Rather, she had to produce factual evidence showing that the accident occurred under circumstances that entitled her to the presumption.

"[T]here is essentially no evidence before the court on which to consider the motion - only the parties' dueling arguments," the court explained. "On this meager record, lacking in any evidence describing the circumstances of the accident, the court can only conclude that there are material facts in dispute."

For example, the plaintiff failed to cite testimony from depositions given by her and the defendant before she filed the motion. Nor did she provide affidavits setting out additional facts.

Continue reading "Court Says Florida Rear-End Accident Lawsuit Requires Fact Evidence - Arce v. Mullane" »

Accidents can happen at any time and in any place. Yet, some activities are so "inherently dangerous" that they're more likely to result in an injury. In Smyth v. Infrastructure Corp. of America, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal explains the law as it applies to these activities.

Edward Smyth died in a Florida car accident on I-75 outside of Riverview. Smyth was driving in the left lane at around 9:00 p.m. when a car in front of him slammed the brakes. Smyth's car veered into the right lane, where it collided with a tank truck carrying fuel. His car became trapped under the truck as the tank caught fire and Smyth was killed in the blaze.

According to a state trooper who was driving nearby, the lead car hit the brakes because a large lawn mower was traveling at about 25 miles an hour in front of it. Meanwhile, the Court explained that further investigation showed that the car behind Smyth's slammed into the back left side of Smyth's car, propelling it into the other lane where the car collided with the truck.

Smyth's wife, Kay, sued Infrastructure Corporation of America and the Florida Department of Transportation for wrongful death. She claimed that the lawn mower was owned by Titan Lawn Service, a company acting as an unauthorized subcontractor for ICA, which had been hired by DOT to cut the grass adjacent to the road. Kay also sued the driver of the car behind her husband's, a claim that was later settled.

A trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, apparently finding that any duty that ICA and DOT owed to Smyth had been delegated to Titan, the responsible party. The Second District disagreed, however, finding that the evidence in the record was not sufficient to support this decision.

Continue reading "Court Says Fatal Lawn Mower Accident on Highway May Have Involved 'Inherently Dangerous Activity' - Smyth v. Infrastructure Corp. of America " »

In previous posts, we've discussed the presumption of negligence in rear end car accident cases, in which the rear driver is typically considered liable for the accident. We've also talked about how the presumption can be overcome. In its recent ruling in Douglas-Seibert v. Riccucci, however, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal explains that rebutting the presumption is an uphill climb.

Dianna Douglas-Seibert was injured in a Florida car accident when the vehicle she was driving was rear-ended by a cement truck driven by Louis Riccucci. The vehicles - Douglas-Seibert's car was trailing an SUV and the cement truck was behind Douglas-Seibert - were traveling in the far left lane when another car entered the road on the right side and crossed three lanes of traffic before turning left. The SUV braked to avoid hitting the car, as did Douglas-Seibert. The SUV began moving forward once the other car cleared, but Douglas-Seibert did not. She remained stopped when the cement truck rear-ended her car.

Douglas-Seibert sued Riccucci and his employer, Tarmac. The matter proceeded to trial, at the close of which Douglas-Seibert moved for a directed verdict, citing the rear end negligence presumption. She also argued that there was no evidence to show that she was partially at fault for the accident. The trial court denied the motion with respect to Riccucci's negligence and granted it regarding Douglas-Seibert's comparative negligence. A jury later found that the defendants were not liable for the accident.

On appeal, the Fifth District reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Riccucci did not present enough evidence to rebut the negligence presumption.

The court explained that a rear driver can overcome the presumption based on four defenses: mechanical failure; the lead driver's unexpected, sudden stop; a sudden lane change by the lead driver; and an illegal or improper stop by the lead driver. Riccucci argued that Douglas-Siebert's stop and failure to start driving again after the SUV moved forward constituted either a sudden or illegal or improper stop. Yet, according to the court, evidence of a sudden stop alone is not enough to rebut the presumption because drivers are expected to anticipate these stops. Citing the Florida Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Clampitt v. D.J. Spencer Sales, the court said that the rear driver has the power to control following distance, and therefore should be responsible for anticipating some stops.

Continue reading "Court Finds Cement Truck Driver Liable in Florida Rear End Accident - Douglas-Seibert v. Riccucci" »

We've previously explained the presumption of negligence in rear end accidents, under which Florida law essentially assumes that the rear driver caused the crash. In Cevallos v. Rideout, the Florida Supreme Court recently ruled that this presumption can be overcome, however, with evidence showing that the front driver was in fact negligent.

Maria Cevallos was injured in a car accident when the automobile she was driving rear-ended a vehicle driven by Kerri Anne Rideout. Cevallos later sued Rideout for negligence. As the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained:

The accident occurred when a non-party attempted to avoid a disabled vehicle on the downhill slope of an overpass. Two non-party vehicles were able to avoid colliding with the disabled vehicle and each other. The third vehicle driven by the defendant [Rideout], the fourth vehicle driven by the plaintiff [Cevallos], and the fifth vehicle driven by another non-party, were not that lucky.

Nevertheless, a trial court entered a directed verdict to Rideout when Cevallos sued her for negligence. The ruling was based on the well-settled presumption of negligence. The Fourth District affirmed the decision on appeal, ruling that the presumption could not be overcome with evidence of a front driver's negligence and that a rear driver's action for negligence is barred unless the driver can show that he or she was not negligent at all.

The state Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the presumption can be rebutted with evidence of the front driver's negligence. "[T]he facts introduced into evidence at trial provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the defendant failed to use ordinary care in operating her vehicle, and that this failure was at least one of the proximate causes of the collision between the plaintiff's vehicle and the defendant's vehicle," the Court ruled.

The Court also issued a ruling on a similar case, Birge v. Charron, in the same opinion. In that case, the Court explained that rear-end accident litigation is governed by the principles of comparative negligence, providing that a person who is injured partly due to his or her own negligence can hold another liable proportionately.

Continue reading "Supreme Court: Injured Driver Can Rebut Florida's Rear-End Presumption" »

In jury trials, it's the judge's role to determine preliminary legal issues, but it is the jury's role to make factual conclusions. The jury, in other words, decides what actually happened. As a result, jury selection is a key aspect of trials on a wide variety of matters, including car accidents, as the Third District Court of Appeal's recent decision in Borroto v. Garcia makes clear.

Norma Borroto was injured in an accident in Florida when the car in which she was a passenger was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Jose Garcia. She sued Garcia in state court seeking money damages. During jury selection, the trial judge asked each of the prospective jurors whether they had ever suffered an injury - in a car accident or otherwise - which required the person to seek medical treatment.

As the process continued, counsel for Garcia used peremptory challenges, by which each party may choose certain potential jurors to exclude from the jury, to remove all but one member of the jury pool who had previously been injured in accidents and had required treatment.

Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Borroto, awarding her more than $105,000 in damages.

Garcia filed a motion for new trial along with a motion requesting to interview the jury members, alleging that two of them failed to disclose that they had previously been involved in car accidents. Both of these jurors, according to Garcia, suffered injuries for which they sought medical attention and filed claims under Florida's personal injury protection (PIP) law. The trial court denied both motions.

Continue reading "The Importance of Jury Selection in Florida Car Accident Cases - Borroto v. Garcia" »

This blog typically covers cases concerning the various and often complex legal issues that arise as the result of a Florida car accident. The Fourth District Court of Appeal's recent ruling in Rubinger v. State is a good reminder that these issues may extended to criminal responsibility.

Ariella Rubinger was charged with several counts of DUI and one count of vehicular homicide stemming from a two-car accident in which the driver of the other vehicle was killed. The victim was traveling ahead of Rubinger on Interstate 595. The car slowed to exit the highway and was reportedly rear-ended by Rubinger's car.

The prosecution provided evidence showing that Rubinger was speeding at the time of the accident, which she denied. According to emergency personnel and police officers who arrived on the scene shortly after the accident, Rubinger was distracted, indifferent and seemingly unconcerned about the severity of the crash. "They testified that Rubinger's main focus seemed to be getting to a party, and she was overheard asking someone on the phone to come pick her up and take her to Miami," the court explained. Despite this behavior, none of the witnesses testified that Rubinger smelled of alcohol or appeared intoxicated.

Despite protests from Rubinger, the trial court allowed the prosecutors to present testimony at trial concerning Rubinger's behavior after the accident. A jury found her not guilty of the DUI and vehicular homicide charges, but guilty for a lesser offense of culpable negligence, which typically applies where a defendant's negligence is so gross that it evinces a criminal disregard for others' safety.

On appeal, the Fourth District ruled that the trial court should not have allowed the State to present the evidence of Rubinger's post-accident behavior. "Evidence is only relevant if it tends to prove or disprove a material fact," the Court explained. "Here, the evidence at issue did not tend to prove that Rubinger was driving recklessly at the time of the accident" only that she may have been acting strangely after the accident.

Continue reading "Court Reverses Criminal Conviction for Driver in Deadly Florida Car Accident - Rubinger v. State" »

In addition to serious injury and property damage, a Florida car accident can raise a number of complex legal issues regarding fault and liability. As the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Goheagan v. American Vehicle Insurance Company makes clear, these issues can become even more complicated when insurance companies get involved.

The case stemmed from a high-speed car accident in which John Perkins' vehicle rear-ended a car driven by Molly Swaby, who was severely injured and remained in a coma until she died three months later. Perkins reported the accident to his insurer, American Vehicle Insurance Company, two days after it occurred. AVIC claims adjuster Lee Ann Grieser told Perkins the company would attempt to settle the matter for $10,000 - the maximum amount for which Perkins was insured.

Grieser was unable, however, to get in contact with Swaby's mother, Olive Goheagan, who evaded Grieser during a series of phone calls. Grieser later learned that Goheagan had filed a wrongful death suit against Perkins. Goheagan later rejected AVIC's offer to settle the matter for $10,000.

Following trial in the wrongful death suit, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Goheagan, awarding her nearly $2.9 million in damages and another $20,000 in costs. Goheagan then sued AVIC, claiming that the company breached its duty of good faith owed to Perkins by failing to simply issue Swaby a check for $10,000. A trial court granted AVIC's motion for summary judgment, however, ruling that it would have been futile for the company to issue a check to Swaby because she was in a coma and never recovered. Goheagan, meanwhile, was not authorized to receive payment on Swaby's behalf, according to the court.

On appeal, the Fourth District upheld the lower court's ruling, but based on different reasoning. "When an insurer is handling claims against its insured, it has a duty to use the same degree of care and diligence as a person of ordinary care and prudence should exercise in the management of his own business," the Court explained, citing the state Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Perera v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty. That includes a duty to "settle the claim if possible, where a reasonably prudent person . . . would do so," according to the Court.

Continue reading "Insurance Issues in Florida Car Accident Lawsuits - Goheagan v. American Vehicle Insurance Company" »

In Florida, "loss of consortium" is a legal injury parties in accident claims typically raise in relation to the effects of an accident on a couple's sex life. In Peterson v. Sun State International Trucks, however, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explains that consortium damages can be sought for any deterioration in a marriage caused by the effects of an accident, sexual or otherwise.

Lorie Peterson was injured in a car accident in Florida when the car she was driving was rear-ended by a truck driven by a Sun State employee. Peterson and her husband Clayton sued the company, alleging that Ms. Peterson suffered severe neck and back injuries as a result of the crash.

The Petersons also sought damages for "loss of consortium," which the Court explained is a theory under which the spouse of an injured person seeks redress for loss of "the companionship and fellowship of husband and wife and the right of each to the company, cooperation and aid of the other in every conjugal relation."

Following a trial, a jury awarded Ms. Peterson damages for past and future medical expenses as well as come noneconomic damages. It did not, however, award Mr. Peterson loss of consortium damages. The trial court later denied the Petersons' motion for new trial on the loss of consortium claim.

On appeal, the Second District reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the Petersons' provided uncontroverted evidence showing that the accident adversely affected their marital relationship. Both Mr. and Ms. Peterson testified at trial that Ms. Peterson's injuries and the resulting pain limited her ability to do the things she had previously enjoyed, including housework and traveling. They also testified that Ms. Peterson became ill-tempered and "short" with Mr. Peterson. Specifically, Ms. Peterson said "[i]t's affected me to the point where I've pulled away from him."

Continue reading "Loss of Consortium Damages in Florida Car Accident Cases - Peterson v. Sun State International Trucks" »

Legal liability in a Florida car accident case is not simply a matter of who's right and who's wrong, but also how the dispute is framed to a jury. In Costa v. Aberle, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal considers specific instructions given to the jury in a rear-end accident case.

Rosalva Costa was a passenger in a car that was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Joseph Aberle. Costa alleged that she injured her neck and back as a result of the accident. She sought treatment from a chiropractor and, after the pain returned, underwent surgery - performed by Dr. Heldo Gomez, a neurosurgeon - which revealed that Costa was suffering from a "leaking disc." She underwent a second surgery and returned to the chiropractor when the pain continued.

Costa sued Aberle for money damages related to the back and neck injuries sustained in the accident. At trial, the defense presented testimony from a radiologist, an orthopedic surgeon and a neurologist, each of whom stated that the surgeries performed by Dr. Gomez following the accident were not related to the accident. During closing argument, Aberle's attorney asserted that the leaky disc was a result of Dr. Gomez's treatment, rather than the accident.

On Costa's request, the trial judge instructed the jury that the question of whether Costa's medical treatment was necessary should be viewed from her perspective and that any injury she incurred as a result of necessary treatment related to the accident should be considered as caused by Aberle's negligence. The jury found that Aberle was responsible for the injury and awarded Costa $78,132 for past medical expenses and $75,000 for future medical expenses.

Subsequently, however, the trial court granted the defense's motion for a new trial, in which it argued that instructions were not appropriate.

Continue reading "Court Upholds $150,000 Jury Award in Florida Rear-End Car Accident Case - Costa v. Aberle" »

In Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reviews a $2 million verdict in a Florida rear-end car accident case.

Cheryl Cataldo was injured in a car accident when hers was rear-ended by another car owned by Health First and driven by one of the company's employees. She was diagnosed with cervical strain and underwent surgery five months later. Cataldo claimed that she was no longer able to work as a dental hygienist following the accident.

Cataldo sued Health First and the employee, alleging that the employee's negligence caused the accident, which in turn resulted in her injury. She decided to withdraw claims associated with brain and dental injuries she allegedly incurred in the accident shortly before trial was set to begin. According to the Fifth District, "[t]hese claims had been areas of particular dispute, as defense counsel believed Cataldo had been caught in lies during discovery that impacted these claims." The trial court also ruled that Health First would not be allowed to present evidence related to the withdrawn claims in an attempt to impeach Cataldo.

The trial court denied Health First's request for continuance, in which the company's attorney argued that he needed extra time to prepare because the defense had been predicated on the withdrawn claims, Cataldo's medical records all included references to the dropped claims and defense counsel had planned to cross examine Cataldo based her alleged false statements to health care providers. The court also denied subsequent motions for mistrial on the same grounds.

At trial, Cataldo presented evidence of her spine injuries as well as bouts with depression stemming from those injuries. An expert testified that Cataldo was unable to work as a result of the injuries. The jury returned a verdict for Cataldo "in excess of $2,000,000," according to the Fifth District.

Continue reading "Court Upholds $2 Million Verdict in Florida Rear-End Accident Case - Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo" »

So you were injured in a car accident. Then the injury was made worse by medical procedures intended to treat it. In Tucker v. Korpita, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explains that the person whose negligence caused the accident is on the hook for both the original injury and any later aggravation of it.

In 2007, Andrew Korpita and Earleen Tucker were involved in a West Palm Beach car accident in which Korpita rear-ended Tucker. Korpita admitted that he was negligent and a trial was held on the issues of causation and damages.

At trial, two doctors testified about treating Tucker for neck and back injuries following the accident. One, Dr. Robert Simon, testified that he performed a minimally invasive percutaneous discectomy on Tucker, which reduced the effects of her impairment. Another, Dr. Jane Bistline, testified that she performed a lumbar discogram and epidural steroid injections on Tucker. Dr. Bistline found that Tucker suffered from three bulging discs, an impairment she believed to be permanent.

Korpita's personal representative also called a number of doctors to testify, including Drs. Jordan Grabel and Robert Kagan, expert witnesses who testified that the discectomy performed on Korpita by Dr. Simon was not necessary because the procedure is designed to treat people who suffer from a herniated disc. In Dr. Grabel's opinion, Korpita's injury was the result of spondylolisthesis in the lower lumbar spine, a preexisting condition that was not made worse as a result of the accident. Dr. Kagan, meanwhile, concluded that Korpita suffers from a "pseudo herniation" and that the discectomy could have accelerated the effects of the impairment.

At a conference near the close of the trial, Tucker asked the court to instruct the jury that when a person is injured in a car accident as a result of another person's negligence and the resulting injuries are later aggravated by negligent medical care, the negligent driver is considered the proximate cause of both the original injury and any aggravation. The trial court denied this request. The jury found that Tucker was not permanently injured as a result of the accident, but returned a $17,700 verdict in his favor for medical expenses and lost wages.

On appeal, the Fourth District ruled that the trial court should have issued the "intervening cause" instruction to the jury as Tucker requested. The court explained that in Stuart v. Hertz Corp., the Florida Supreme Court held that a person whose negligence causes an accident or injury is responsible for additional injuries caused by the medical negligence of a physician treating the plaintiff for the original injuries.

Continue reading "Court Says Negligent Driver Responsible for Injuries Caused by Accident and Later Medical Treatment - Tucker v. Korpita" »

In Shirey v. State Farm, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal explains the presumption of negligence in a multi-car rear end accident.

After Luanna Shirey was injured in a four-car accident, she and her husband filed suit against the two drivers ahead of her, alleging that they were negligent. The accident occurred when the driver of the lead car (vehicle 1), who was not identified, slowed to turn right into a local business. The second vehicle (vehicle 2), driven by Normal Purcell, and the third vehicle (vehicle 3), driven by William Sabinson, slowed in response. Ms. Shirley's vehicle, the fourth and last, rear-ended Sabinson's car. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the accident was caused by Shirey's negligence.

On appeal, the Fourth District upheld the ruling. The court ruled that the other drivers were entitled to a presumption that Shirey, as the rear driver in the accident, was negligent.

Florida law generally presumes that, in a rear-end collision, the rear driver's actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident and any resulting injuries. In Cevallos v. Rideout, however, the Fourth District held that the presumption can be overcome by establishing that the lead-driver stopped abruptly and arbitrarily.

In this case, the court concluded that there was no evidence showing that either Purcell or Sabinson stopped abruptly and arbitrarily. Both testified at deposition that they stopped in response to vehicle 1 and that their cars did not collide until Shirey's car slammed into Sabinson's. Furthermore, a traffic reconstruction expert testified that although vehicle 1 may have turned abruptly, Purcell and Sabinson "maintained the safe operation of their respective vehicles in response to the phantom vehicle's right-hand turn," according to the court.

Continue reading "The Presumption of Negligence in a Multi-Car Rear End Accident - Shirey v. State Farm" »

Every day, the Sunshine State's roads and highways are full of drivers headed to and from work. When one of those drivers causes an accident, not only may he or she be liable for any injuries that result, but - in some cases - the driver's employer may also be responsible. In Jones v. Latex, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considers a suit against both a negligent motorist and his employer.

Wenford Killings died in a car accident in Callahan, Florida when a pick-up truck driven by Donald Cone rear-ended the car that Killings was driving. Cone was working for Latex Construction Company at the time, laying gas pipeline on a moving worksite, which was making its way from Georgia through Florida. Elva Jones sued both Cone and Latex on behalf of Killings' estate, alleging that Cone's negligence caused the accident and that Latex was liable under the legal doctrine respondeat superior, which provides that an employer is generally responsible for the actions of its workers performed in the course of employment.

While both Cone and Latex admitted that he was negligent and caused the accident, Latex argued that it could not be held liable because Cone was not the company's agent at the time the accident occurred. The only evidence presented at trial regarding this issue was the testimony of the police officer who responded to the scene of the accident. The officer testified that Cone told the officer that he was on his way to work when his car plowed into Killings' vehicle.

At the close of the trial, the district court granted Latex's motion for directed verdict, ruling that Jones failed to provide sufficient evidence on which a jury could find Latex liable.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. "The general rule is that an employee who is going to or coming from work is not acting within the scope of his employment," the court noted, citing Section 440.092(2), Florida Statutes.

Continue reading "Suing a Driver's Employer in a Florida Car Accident Case - Jones v. Latex" »

Florida auto accident litigation, like many other lawsuits, often involves conflicting recollections of the facts. In Miller v. Perez, the Second District Court of Appeal explains that this makes certain cases difficult to decide in the summary judgment stage.

Plaintiff Truman McGill was injured in a car accident when the tractor-trailer he was driving allegedly rear-ended a truck driven by Defendant Martin Perez. The accident occurred when Mr. Perez turned right to travel south on to the road on which McGill was also traveling. McGill's tractor-trailer collided with Perez's truck when Perez merged into the right-hand lane.

McGill sued Perez for negligence. Prior to trial, Perez filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that McGill could present no set of facts to overcome the presumption that the following driver in a rear end collision is negligent. The presumption is that the rear driver's actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident and any resulting injuries in a rear end accident. The circuit court agreed with Perez, granting summary judgment in his favor.

On appeal, the court noted that "the presumption that the following driver in a motor vehicle accident is negligent can be rebutted when that driver 'produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed.'" In this case, according to the court, a number of factual issues remained to be resolved that may ultimately rebut the presumption. For example, "the parties differed about whether fog was present and about whether the road was wet" along with the question of whether Mr. Perez's lights were on at the time of the accident. More importantly, McGill alleged that Perez failed to properly yield before merging and did not have enough time to accelerate when he merged.

The court held that because there remained disputes as to facts material to the rear-end presumption, summary judgment was not appropriate. Furthermore, even if McGill cannot overcome the rear end presumption, evidence indicating that the lead driver may have been negligent raises issues of shared liability and proportionate damages, which should be determined by a jury rather than at the summary judgment stage. Florida operates under a comparative negligence system, in which a person who is injured partly due to his or her own negligence can hold another negligent party proportionately liable. Thus, if McGill can show negligence on Perez's part, he may be entitled to proportionate damages.

Continue reading "Florida Court Reverses Ruling in Tractor-Trailer Rear End Accident - Miller v. Perez" »

Under certain circumstances, state law presumes that a Florida rear end auto accident is caused by the rear driver in the accident. In Sorel v. Koonce, the First District Court of Appeal explains how the presumption works and when it should be applied.

Cindy Sorel was injured when in a rear end accident when her car was hit from behind by a Comcast van driven by Troy Koonce. She filed a negligence action against both Koonce and Comcast, asserting that Koonce was responsible for the accident.

Sorel was seated in the front passenger seat - her husband was driving and their son was seated in the back - when the accident happened. The Sorels' car was the second of three waiting for a green left turn arrow at a traffic light. The Comcast van was directly behind them. Each of the three cars began to move forward when the light turned green. The Sorels testified at trial that, as they were turning, a car ran a red light through the intersection, which caused Mr. Sorel to brake. When he did, the Comcast van collided into the back of the Sorels' vehicle.

The trial court rejected Plaintiff's request for a directed verdict. After a jury found that her injury was not caused by Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a new trial, asserting that the trial court should have entered a verdict in her favor.

"Case law has identified a rebuttable 'presumption of negligence' in favor of the front driver in a rear-end collision," the First District noted in reversing the trial court's decision. Specifically, the presumption is that the rear driver's actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident and any resulting injuries, according to the court. However, the rear driver can overcome the presumption by presenting evidence that "fairly and reasonably tends to show" that it is misplaced in a particular case. While proof that the lead driver made a sudden stop is generally insufficient to rebut the presumption, evidence that the sudden stop was "at a time and place where it could not reasonably be expected by the following driver" will serve as a rebuttal, the court explained.

Continue reading "Court Explains Causation Presumption in Florida Rear End Car Accidents - Sorel v. Koonce" »