South Florida Car Accident Law Blog

In Casteel v. Maddalena, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal explains that in order for a party to a car accident lawsuit to get a new trial based on fraud, he or she must show that the other party actually participated in or approved of the fraud. When relying on new evidence to support a retrial motion, the party must show that he or she couldn't have gotten their hands on the new evidence any sooner.

John Casteel was injured in an accident while riding a motorcycle when he was hit by a car driven by Anna Maddalena. According to Casteel, he stopped at a stop sign seeking to make a left turn onto a highway. He then proceeded to cross the road's northbound lanes and stopped the bike at the median, attempting to complete the left turn when Maddalena's car hit him.

Maddalena, conversely, said that Casteel was not in the median and instead remained in her lane when the accident occurred. She further claimed that she hit the brakes as well as the car's horn when she saw that Casteel was in the way and that Casteel was still moving as the car collided with him.

Following trial, a jury determined that Casteel was 55 percent liable for the accident and Maddalena was 45 percent liable. The trial centered on the location of the accident, and, as the court explained, "the issue of whether Maddalena skidded to a stop on impact became the main focus." Maddalena argued that she did not skid and that skid marks shown in a photo of the scene were not made by her car.

Melanie Lopez, Casteel's girlfriend, testified that she saw the skid marks when she arrived at the scene shortly after the accident and that she later returned to photograph them. Lopez lived very close to the scene and further testified that she personally knew that the road had been paved just a day earlier. Lopez was expected to testify about damages - specifically Casteel's health before the accident - rather than liability, and her testimony apparently caught Maddalena by surprise. Maddalena's attorney later investigated the matter, finding that the road had actually been paved somewhere between 10 days and three weeks prior to the accident.

Continue reading "Fraud and Newly Discovered Evidence in Florida Car Accident Cases - Casteel v. Maddalena" »

Bad faith actions against insurance companies are fairly common in Florida, but many people may not even be aware of this avenue for seeking damages from an insurer that fails to hold up its end of the bargain. The U.S. District Court explains the bad faith cause of action in Markel American Insurance Company v. Flugga.

Mr. Flugga was injured in an April 2010 accident on Country Road 44 when his motorcycle collided with a car carrying two people. Flugga was at fault for the accident in which he and his passenger - Ms. Baker - were seriously injured. Flugga's sister informed his insurer, Markel American Insurance Company, of the accident four days later.

In response to a request from Baker's lawyer, Markel sent the attorney information concerning Flugga's coverage on April 27, 2010. After the insurance company requested information about Baker's injuries in June 2010, her attorney informed the company a month later that there was a publicly recorded hospital lien for more than $72,000 related to Baker's treatment for her injuries. The lawyer also noted that Baker had sued Flugga for negligence in state court.

Markel located the lein through an online search in August 2010 and tendered a check to Baker for $10,000, the maximum amount of coverage under the plan. The check was returned, uncashed, a little more than one month later. Neither party demanded nor offered a settlement during this time.

On the day before trial was set to begin in Baker's negligence suit, Markel filed an action in the Middle District, a federal district court, seeking a declaratory judgment ruling that the company was not liable for "bad faith" with respect to its handling of Baker's claim.

As the court explained, Florida law allows an insured person to sue his or her insurance company when the insurer acts in bad faith in attempting to settle claims against the person and a judgment is later entered against the insured that exceeds his or her coverage. This claim can be brought to recover the difference between the judgment amount and the individual's coverage.

Continue reading "Court Explains Insurance "Bad Faith" Claims in Florida Motorcycle Accident Suit - Markel American Insurance Company v. Flugga" »

Car accidents happen. Sometimes they are caused by one person's fault; other times the negligence is spread among several drivers. In Diaz v. FedEx, Florida's Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal explains that a person injured in an accident can recover for some of his or her damages - even if the person was negligent in causing the accident - if another driver was also at fault.

Yuniel Diaz was killed in an accident in Orlando when the motorcycle he was driving was struck by a FedEx truck driven by Vincent Jackson. Although Diaz was traveling somewhere between 59 and 79 miles an hour - much faster than the 45 MPH speed limit posted - the personal representative of his estate sued FedEx, claiming that Jackson was comparatively negligent. Under Florida's comparative negligence system, a person who is injured partly due to his or her own negligence can hold another party liable proportionately.

The estate claimed that Jackson failed to stop at a stop sign before proceeding to make a left turn, during which Diaz's motorcycle slammed into the broad side of the truck. Jackson testified that he came to a complete stop at the sign, while the estate presented experts to rebut this claim. Three eyewitnesses to the accident were unable to tell one way or the other whether Jackson stopped before proceeding to turn.

The trial court granted a motion in limine by the estate barring evidence about any citations or assignment of fault related to the accident made by the police officer who responded to the scene. Nevertheless, FedEx's counsel proceeded to ask the officer - Detective Harold Felshaw - about whether there were any factors that contributed to the crash other than Diaz's excessive speed. Based on the evidence at the scene, Felshaw said he had "no reason to feel there was any fault on the part of" Jackson.

The trial court ruled that this testimony violated its order on the motion in limine. Instead of granting a mistrial, however, it instructed the jury not to consider the detective's testimony concerning fault in the accident. The jury later ruled in favor of FedEx, finding that Diaz was completely liable for his own death.

Continue reading "Court Reverses Florida Motorcycle Accident Ruling on Comparative Negligence Grounds - Diaz v. FedEx" »

The stakes are often very high in Florida car accident lawsuits. As the Sixth District Court of Appeal's recent ruling in Adams v. Barkman shows, there are a number of legal issues arising prior to trial that can make or break a case.

Laura Barkman and Randall Hobbs were injured in an accident when the motorcycle Hobbs was driving, and on which Barkman was a passenger, was struck by an SUV driven by Kara Adams. They sued Adams for negligence, alleging that the accident happened after she made a quick lane change. Adams, meanwhile, argued that she did not make a lane change. Instead, she argued that the motorcycle simply plowed into the back of her car.

Before trial, the trial judge granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, in which they asked the court to bar Defendant from presenting as evidence the report by a highway trooper who responded to the scene of the accident as well as evidence related to Barkman's consumption of alcohol prior to the accident. The court ruled that the trooper was not competent to determine whether Adams had suddenly changed lanes prior to the accident because he was not there. His testimony at trial, therefore, was to be limited to his observances after arriving at the scene. Furthermore, the court found that evidence showing that Barkman was intoxicated prior to the accident was irrelevant because she was not driving. No evidence was presented showing that Hobbs was also intoxicated.

The court further ruled that in the first part of the trial, intended to determine whether the accident was caused by negligence (but not whether negligence also caused Plaintiffs' injuries), the parties could not address the issue of whether Plaintiffs were wearing helmets at the time of the crash.

At trial, Defendant's lawyer - Mr. Fischer - appeared to be determined to cover issues excluded by these rulings, according to the Sixth District. He asked prospective jurors whether they wore helmets while riding bicycles. On cross-examination of Plaintiffs' first witness, he asked the witness - who had been drinking with Barkman prior to the accident - about these activities. Fischer also asked the witness, who was riding a motorcycle nearby at the time of the accident, whether he was wearing a helmet during that ride.

Continue reading "Florida Court Upholds $1.3 Million Verdict in Motorcycle-SUV Accident, Citing 'Attorney Shenanigans' - Adams v. Barkman" »

If you're injured in a car accident caused by another person's negligence, you are likely entitled to a legal remedy. But as the District Court for the Middle District of Florida explained in Williams v. Benway, first you need to know who to sue.

Anthony Williams was injured in an accident when his motorcycle was struck by a car driven by Kathleen Benway somewhere between Orlando and Bradenton. Benway, an attorney for the Federal Trade Commission, was traveling on business when the accident occurred. Specifically, she had traveled to Orlando from D.C. to conduct an investigation on a Thursday and was scheduled to conduct an interview in Tampa the following Monday. Over the weekend, she had planned to stay with her mother in Bradenton.

Williams sued Benway for negligence. After certifying that Benway was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the action, the United States was be substituted as a defendant in the action. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the U.S. "assumes liability for a tort that a federal government employee commits while acting within the scope of employment, as determined under the law of the state where the tort occurred," the Court explained. Williams then filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that Benway is the appropriate defendant because she was acting outside of her employment for vicarious liability purposes under Florida law.

The Court denied Williams' motion, finding that the U.S. was the proper defendant in the action. Noting that "[t]he liability of an employer for an injury caused by a traveling employee driving a vehicle at the employer's instruction began with horse-drawn carriages and applied immediately to automobiles," the Court said that an exception to such liability arises where the employee deviates from the employer's business. Citing its 2006 decision in Howland v. Hertz. Corp., the Court further stated that "[a]n employee who negligently injures a bystander while traveling for the employer acts within the scope of employment, unless the injury occurred during a distinct departure or a routine commute."

In this case, Benway traveled to Florida for her employer's benefit. Because the business she was conducting was to take place over the course of more than one day, she necessarily also needed to travel toward accommodation. That she was headed to her mother's home rather than a hotel did not mean that she was deviating from the business purpose of the trip, according to the Court.

Continue reading "Florida Court Dismisses Car Accident Suit Against Wrong Defendant - Williams v. Benway" »

In Cook v. MillerCoors, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida takes on a case in which a woman injured in a drunk driving accident sues the maker of the booze that the driver was drinking before the accident.

Heather Cook was injured in a motorcycle accident after being thrown from the motorcycle on which she was passenger. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle driver - John Prado - consumed several cans of Sparks, an alcoholic energy drink. Cook sued MillerCoors, LLC, the drink's manufacturer, alleging negligence in the design and manufacture of the drink as well as a failure to warn consumers of its "uniquely dangerous" characteristics. MillerCoors filed a motion to dismiss the claims.

On appeal, the Middle District found that the Sparks drink was not so qualitatively different from other alcoholic beverages so as to justify disregarding a general rule that purveyors of alcoholic beverages are not liable for injuries resulting from their consumption. The court rejected Cook's argument that Sparks and other alcoholic energy drinks are uniquely dangerous because they appeal to younger drinkers, and because the added caffeine enables people to drink more alcohol than normal without feeling as intoxicated. "Cook's argument overlooks an important point: the alleged 'special risks' manifest themselves only if the consumer chooses to drink in excess," the court observed. Under relevant case law, the court concluded, any person who drinks alcohol does so knowing that he or she may become intoxicated.

The court also held that Cook cannot show that MillerCoors' design and manufacture of the drink proximately caused the accident. "Under Florida law, voluntary drinking of alcohol is the proximate cause of an injury, rather than the manufacture or sale of those intoxicating beverages," the court noted, quoting the Southern District of Florida's 2001 decision in Bruner v. Anheuser-Busch. Furthermore, Section 768.125, Florida Statutes protects MillerCoors from liability, providing that a person or entity who gives or sells alcohol to a person of legal age is not responsible for any injury or damage caused as a result of the person's intoxication.

Regarding MillerCoors alleged failure to warn drinkers about the "special risks" associated with the drink, the court observed that a manufacturer does not have a duty to warn consumers of dangers which are obvious or commonly known. The court found that the dangers of drinking alcohol manifest themselves when consumed in excess, "and there is no duty to warn in that circumstance."

Continue reading "Florida Court Dismisses Suit Against Alcoholic Energy Drink Maker in Drunk Motorcycle Driving Case - Cook v. MillerCoors" »