South Florida Car Accident Law Blog

6/12In Poston v. Wiggins, Florida's First District Court of Appeals ruled that a couple suing for injuries sustained in a car accident is entitled to get the other driver's pharmacy records for the year leading up to the crash.

Mr. and Mrs. Wiggins were involved in a car accident with Mrs. Poston while Poston was backing out of a parking space. The couple sued Poston for negligence. In an answer to the Wiggins' complaint, Poston denied liability. She also said that she was not injured in the accident and provided information about her prescription medication use in the 12 hours prior to the crash. Prior to trial, however, Poston testified in a deposition that her osteoarthritis had gotten worse since the accident and provided additional information about her prescription medication usage.

The Wiggins' later sought to obtain Poston's pharmacy records for the year leading up to the accident as well as medical records from her treating physician from the date of the accident going forward. They claimed that Poston had given contradicting information about her medication use and seemed to indicate in the deposition that the osteoarthritis had been made worse as a result of the accident.

Poston resisted the discovery requests, claiming that the information sought was irrelevant because she had not filed a counterclaim against the couple and did not allege that she suffered bodily injury in the accident. Citing "the existence of inconsistencies," however, a trial court found that the Wiggins' were entitled to the information and documentation requested.

On appeal, the First District agreed that Poston was required to divulge the pharmacy medication information. "In the instant case, the pre-accident pharmacy records appear to be relevant to the issue of negligence in the case and are potentially discoverable," the court explained. Meanwhile, the court said that any harm to Poston's privacy interests posed by turning over the records was "premature and speculative."

Continue reading "Florida Court Rules on Medication Records Access in Car Accident Case - Poston v. Wiggins" »

When a car accident happens, the resulting damage can extend far beyond busted tail-lights and broken bones, and often includes long-term effects like loss of future earning capacity. In Lagalante v. State Farm, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida explains that a person seeking the latter form of damages bears the burden of proving that his or her ability to earn money has been weakened because of the crash.

Mr. Lagalante was injured in a car accident in Florida and later sued his insurance company for benefits from a uninsured/underinsured motorist policy. Following trial, a jury ruled in favor of Lagalante, awarding him nearly $250,000 in damages. The award included more than $50,000 for medical expenses, more than $8,000 in past lost earnings and $24,000 for lost earning capacity. The jury also awarded Lagalante $165,000 for pain and suffering, disability, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life.

State Farm then moved for a directed verdict on the future earnings capacity issue, arguing that Lagalante failed to establish that he was entitled to the award. Specifically, the company argued that he did not show that he was fired from his job because of the accident, or that any permanent injury suffered as a result of the crash kept him from performing his job duties.

The District Court agreed. "Florida law does not recognize a claim for future loss of earnings but does recognize a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity," the court explained, citing the state's Second District Court of Appeals' 2007 decision in Truelove v. Blount. "Thus, the purpose of a jury's award of damages for loss of any future earning capacity is to compensate a plaintiff for loss of capacity to earn income as opposed to actual loss of future earnings."

Here, according to the court, the only evidence that Lagalante presented on the issue was the difference between the $100,000 salary he made in his job at the time of the accident and the $68,000 he made in a new job after the crash. Although he was fired shortly after returning from related medical leave, Lagalante did not point to specific evidence showing that he was fired because of the accident. He did claim, however, that he was not able to work at the same production level because of injuries sustained in the accident.

Continue reading "Loss of Earning Capacity in Florida Car Accident Cases - Lagalante v. State Farm " »

In Roman v. Bogle, the Fifth District Court of Appeals explains two legal principles that often arise in cases where a person injured in a car accident attempts to recover damages from someone other than the negligent driver: agency and the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.

The lawsuit stemmed from a tragic Florida car accident in which the driver (Mr. Gabriel) and his passenger (Valentin) were killed when the car allegedly ran a red light and was struck by a semi-trailer. Roman, Valentin's mother and the personal representative of his estate, sued for wrongful death. She filed the action against Bogle, the representative of Gabriel's estate, and Gabriel's father. Roman alleged that the father was responsible as owner of the car under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.

"The dangerous instrumentality doctrine provides that an automobile owner may be held vicariously liable for damages caused by a negligent driver who operates the vehicle with the owner's consent," the court explained.

At some point in the proceedings, the parties reached an agreement by which Roman released the father, his insurance company and "their officers, agents, employees, successors and assigns" from all claims related to the accident in exchange for $10,000. Bogle later argued that Roman could not proceed with the claims against the estate because Gabriel was an "agent" of his father as he was driving the car with his father's consent. Thus, according to Bogle, the claims against Gabriel's estate were released as part of the agreement. The trial court agreed and entered judgment in Bogle's favor.

The Fifth District reversed the decision on appeal, however, finding that application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine does not make a driver the agent of a car's owner. "While the doctrine may apply to instances where an agency relationship exists between the owner and driver, that relationship is not necessary in order to make the doctrine applicable," the court said. Rather, agency must be established by showing that: the owner acknowledged that the driver could act on his behalf; the agent accepted the relationship; and the owner controlled the driver's actions.

Continue reading "Third-Party Liability, Agency and Dangerous Instrumentalities in Florida Car Accident Cases - Roman v. Bogle" »

In Gira v. Wolfe, Florida's Second District Court of Appeals explains that an insurance company must make certain disclosures about a policyholder's coverage after he or she is involved in a car accident.

Ms. Gira was injured in a July 2010 accident when she was struck by a car driven by Ms. Wolfe. Southern-Owners Insurance Company, Wolfe's auto insurer, sent Gira a check for $50,000 a month later. The package also included a disclosure statement required by state law in which the company indicated that the money represented the limits of Wolfe's policy for bodily injury. A space next to "other available insurance" was left blank.

Gira's attorney originally returned the check to Southern-Owners, indicating that he was still conducting an investigation and that Gira was not yet ready to consider a settlement. He later offered to settle the matter for $50,000 and another $440 representing personal property destroyed in the accident. The negotiations broke down when the company allegedly failed to provide the disclosure required under section 627.4137, Florida Statutes, however. Specifically, Gira's attorney claimed that the company did not provide a statement indicating the name and coverage of each of Wolfe's known insurers. Gira then filed suit against Wolfe and her husband for negligence.

A trial court entered judgment in favor of the Wolfes, finding that Gira had made an offer to settle the matter which Southern-Owners accepted and was therefore bound by it. On appeal, Gira argued that the settlement was not enforceable because the Wolfes failed to comply with the terms of it by providing the necessary insurance disclosure. The Second District agreed.

"Gira's settlement offer made it a condition that the insurer provide 'all documents, statements and all information required to be disclosed pursuant to section 627.4137' and that the disclosure be 'in the manner and form required by the statute,'" the court explained. The statute requires a liability insurer to provide the disclosures - including the name and coverage of each known insurer - and forward a request for information to all affected insurers within thirty days of the request.

Continue reading "Court Reverses Decision in Florida Auto Accident Citing Insurer's Failure to Make Disclosures - Gira v. Wolfe" »

In Smith v. Llamas, the Second District Court of Appeal took on an important issue in Florida car accident cases - whether a party's injuries are temporary or permanent - and explained that it should usually be decided by a jury.

Llamas was injured in an April 2008 car accident when his car collided with a vehicle driven by Smith. Smith was traveling eastbound and attempted to make a left turn while Llamas was traveling westbound when the crash occurred. Llamas sued Smith for negligence, alleging that he suffered knee and neck injuries in the accident, which he said was caused by Smith's negligence. Smith argued that she was not completely responsible for the accident pursuant to Florida's comparative negligence standard, allowing liability to be determined proportionately based on each party's share of the blame.

At the close of trial, a jury found that Smith was solely liable for the accident and awarded Llamas just under $40,000 in damages. The entire amount was for past medical expenses. The jury did not award any damages for future expenses, finding that Llamas' injuries were not permanent, nor for pain and suffering.

The trial court later granted Llamas' request for a new trial, in which he claimed that the evidence indisputably showed that he sustained injuries that were both permanent and related to the crash. The Second District reversed the decision on appeal, however, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by disrupting the jury verdict.

In order for a verdict to be so unjust to warrant a new trial, "the evidence must be clear, obvious, and indisputable," the court explained, citing its 2004 decision in Harlan Bakeries v. Snow. "[W]here there is conflicting evidence, the weight to be given that evidence is within the province of the jury."

Continue reading "Damages in Florida Car Accident Cases Depend on Whether Injuries Are Permanent - Smith v. Llamas" »

In Florida car accident cases, it's usually up to a jury to decide the facts, including whether or not either party was negligent in causing the crash, as well as the extent of any related injuries. In Duclos v. Richardson, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explains that a court must have a very good reason for removing this function from a jury.

Jeanette Richardson injured her neck in a May 2006 car accident with Michael Duclos. She sued Duclos for damages under Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes. The law allows a person to recover for injuries caused by another's use of a motor vehicle and which are permanent "within a reasonable degree of medical probability."

Three expert witnesses testified at trial that Richardson's injury was permanent. Conversely, orthopedic surgeon Dr. Von Thron testified for the defense that the injury was not permanent. According to Von Thron, who examined Richardson and reviewed her medical files, Richardson's neck pain from the accident was temporary and any recent pain was the result of a separate condition: arthritis.

A jury returned a verdict awarding Richardson damages for her past medical expenses, but found that the injury was not permanent and therefore did not award her damages for future medical costs. The trial court, however, granted Richardson's motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the issue of injury permanence. Specifically, the court ruled that Von Thron's testimony was "confusing, mistaken and not reasonable in light of all the other evidence in the case..." As a result, the court said that a verdict should be entered in Richardson's favor finding that her injury from the crash is permanent.

On appeal, the First District ruled that the trial court's directed verdict was not warranted. As the court explained, a JNOV should be entered only where a reasonable jury could reach a different decision based on the evidence. Where the evidence is conflicting, the matter should generally be left for a jury to decide. That said, the appeals court warned that "[e]ven if contrary expert evidence is presented, a directed verdict is justified where an expert's testimony is so equivocal, confusing, and internally contradictory and irreconcilable as utterly to lack any probative value," citing its 2006 ruling in Simmons-Russ v. Emko.

Continue reading "Court Says Jury Should Decide Whether Florida Car Accident Injury is Permanent - Duclos v. Richardson" »

In Casteel v. Maddalena, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal explains that in order for a party to a car accident lawsuit to get a new trial based on fraud, he or she must show that the other party actually participated in or approved of the fraud. When relying on new evidence to support a retrial motion, the party must show that he or she couldn't have gotten their hands on the new evidence any sooner.

John Casteel was injured in an accident while riding a motorcycle when he was hit by a car driven by Anna Maddalena. According to Casteel, he stopped at a stop sign seeking to make a left turn onto a highway. He then proceeded to cross the road's northbound lanes and stopped the bike at the median, attempting to complete the left turn when Maddalena's car hit him.

Maddalena, conversely, said that Casteel was not in the median and instead remained in her lane when the accident occurred. She further claimed that she hit the brakes as well as the car's horn when she saw that Casteel was in the way and that Casteel was still moving as the car collided with him.

Following trial, a jury determined that Casteel was 55 percent liable for the accident and Maddalena was 45 percent liable. The trial centered on the location of the accident, and, as the court explained, "the issue of whether Maddalena skidded to a stop on impact became the main focus." Maddalena argued that she did not skid and that skid marks shown in a photo of the scene were not made by her car.

Melanie Lopez, Casteel's girlfriend, testified that she saw the skid marks when she arrived at the scene shortly after the accident and that she later returned to photograph them. Lopez lived very close to the scene and further testified that she personally knew that the road had been paved just a day earlier. Lopez was expected to testify about damages - specifically Casteel's health before the accident - rather than liability, and her testimony apparently caught Maddalena by surprise. Maddalena's attorney later investigated the matter, finding that the road had actually been paved somewhere between 10 days and three weeks prior to the accident.

Continue reading "Fraud and Newly Discovered Evidence in Florida Car Accident Cases - Casteel v. Maddalena" »

As we have mentioned in previous blog posts, it's not just a negligent driver who may be responsible for a Florida car accident. There may also be liability for the car's owner and the driver's employer, for example. In Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Trust, the Florida Supreme Court explains that liability normally does not extend to an owner who leases the vehicle to another person or entity.

In January 2003, a Virginia law firm leased a car from a company that later assigned its interest in the vehicle to DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Trust. Under the terms of the lease, the firm was required obtain a minimum amount of insurance coverage for injury and damage. Although the firm obtained the necessary coverage, its insurance policy on the car later lapsed for non-payment in June 2003.

Terrell Parham, a firm employee who was authorized to use the car, was driving the vehicle in Florida when he crossed a median and collided with a car driven by Alejandro Rosado. The accident happened one day after the insurance policy lapsed.

Rosado sued the law firm, Parham and DaimlerChrysler. Proceeding under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, he alleged that the company was vicariously liable for Parham's negligence because it violated state law by allowing the insurance to lapse. The doctrine imposes strict vicarious liability on the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts the car to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another.

A trial court granted DaimlerChrysler's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the company was shielded from liability under the state's so-called "Graves Amendment." The Amendment states that a car owner who leases the vehicle is not vicariously liable for harm that results from the use, operation or possession of the car during the term of the lease. The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, holding that the Amendment preempts a Florida statute providing that a lessor is a car's owner for liability purposes if the lessee fails to obtain certain minimal insurance coverage.

Continue reading "Florida Supreme Court: No Accident Liability for Owner Who Leased Car - Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Trust" »

Bad faith actions against insurance companies are fairly common in Florida, but many people may not even be aware of this avenue for seeking damages from an insurer that fails to hold up its end of the bargain. The U.S. District Court explains the bad faith cause of action in Markel American Insurance Company v. Flugga.

Mr. Flugga was injured in an April 2010 accident on Country Road 44 when his motorcycle collided with a car carrying two people. Flugga was at fault for the accident in which he and his passenger - Ms. Baker - were seriously injured. Flugga's sister informed his insurer, Markel American Insurance Company, of the accident four days later.

In response to a request from Baker's lawyer, Markel sent the attorney information concerning Flugga's coverage on April 27, 2010. After the insurance company requested information about Baker's injuries in June 2010, her attorney informed the company a month later that there was a publicly recorded hospital lien for more than $72,000 related to Baker's treatment for her injuries. The lawyer also noted that Baker had sued Flugga for negligence in state court.

Markel located the lein through an online search in August 2010 and tendered a check to Baker for $10,000, the maximum amount of coverage under the plan. The check was returned, uncashed, a little more than one month later. Neither party demanded nor offered a settlement during this time.

On the day before trial was set to begin in Baker's negligence suit, Markel filed an action in the Middle District, a federal district court, seeking a declaratory judgment ruling that the company was not liable for "bad faith" with respect to its handling of Baker's claim.

As the court explained, Florida law allows an insured person to sue his or her insurance company when the insurer acts in bad faith in attempting to settle claims against the person and a judgment is later entered against the insured that exceeds his or her coverage. This claim can be brought to recover the difference between the judgment amount and the individual's coverage.

Continue reading "Court Explains Insurance "Bad Faith" Claims in Florida Motorcycle Accident Suit - Markel American Insurance Company v. Flugga" »

We've talked in a previous blog post about how Florida law generally presumes that the rear driver in a rear-end car accident is responsible for the crash. The presumption is an effective legal tool for a person who has been injured in a rear-end accident. As the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida explains in Arce v. Mullane, however, a person suing for such injury cannot simply rely on the presumption. He or she must also present factual evidence in support of the claim.

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident with the defendant in 2010. According to her version of the incident, the plaintiff was stopped at a red light when she was rear-ended by the defendant's car. She sued the defendant for negligence and later filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that there were no material questions of fact outstanding. The plaintiff further claimed that she was entitled to judgment in her favor based on Florida common law, which presumes that the back driver in a rear-end accident is responsible for the crash.

As the District Court explained, however, the plaintiff could not simply rely on her claim that she was rear-ended and the negligence presumption in order to succeed in the action. Rather, she had to produce factual evidence showing that the accident occurred under circumstances that entitled her to the presumption.

"[T]here is essentially no evidence before the court on which to consider the motion - only the parties' dueling arguments," the court explained. "On this meager record, lacking in any evidence describing the circumstances of the accident, the court can only conclude that there are material facts in dispute."

For example, the plaintiff failed to cite testimony from depositions given by her and the defendant before she filed the motion. Nor did she provide affidavits setting out additional facts.

Continue reading "Court Says Florida Rear-End Accident Lawsuit Requires Fact Evidence - Arce v. Mullane" »

Like love, justice is blind. At least it's supposed to be. The recent arrest of a Florida politician stemming from an allegedly drunken car accident is another reminder that Sunshine State cops are willing to enforce the law of the road, no matter who violates it.

Gainesville mayor Craig Lowe was arrested and charged with DUI following an single-car accident in Alachua County on March 21. According to Florida Highway Patrol, the accident was reported around 2:20 a.m. "Alachua County sheriff's deputies told an FHP trooper they saw Lowe behind the driver's seat when they first arrived and that he appeared intoxicated," The Gainesville Sun's Cindy Swirko and Maru Opabola report. Lowe apparently claimed that the crash happened after he fell asleep behind the wheel, but the cops weren't buying it.

Smelling alcohol, the trooper subjected Lowe to field sobriety tests. He was arrested and transported to county jail after performing poorly. Lowe told the trooper that he'd consumed three beers earlier in the night, but a breathalyzer test performed more than two hours after the accident registered his blood alcohol content at just below the legal limit (.08). Given the time lapse, police said Lowe was likely over the legal limit when the crash occurred.

Lowe was released from jail late that afternoon. He faces charges of DUI with property damage and careless driving. He might also need a new car. The New York Daily News reports that Lowe's 2005 Honda Civic "suffered major front-end damage and had four flat tires."

But Lowe isn't ready to throw himself at the mercy of prosecutors just yet. "I apologize for the harm that this situation has caused to my friends, supporters, and the citizens of Gainesville," he said in a statement. "I feel that it's important to set the record straight. In the coming days, additional facts will come to light and I believe that I will (be) found not guilty in this case."

Continue reading "Florida Crash Damages Local Mayor's Car, Reputation" »

A person who is injured in a car accident not only has the right to an attorney, but also the right to seek legal counsel right away. As the Fourth District Court of Appeal explains in Howard v. Palmer, the timing in which a person obtains a lawyer after a crash cannot be used to try to undermine his claims at trial.

Howard was injured in a car accident that occurred after Palmer ran a stop sign. Palmer was an employee of Groupware International, Inc. and was on the job at the time. Howard sued Palmer and Groupware for negligence.

Prior to trial, Howard filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent defense counsel from introducing evidence related to or referencing the fact that Howard obtained a lawyer on the day of the accident, prior to even seeking medical treatment. In arguing the motion, the defense asserted that the evidence called into question whether Howard suffered permanent injury. If the injury were so serious, he would have gone directly to a doctor, the argument went.

Although the trial court granted Howard's motion, defense counsel proceeded to ask one of Howard's doctors during cross examination whether he was aware that Howard had contacted an attorney prior to seeking treatment. The trial judge sustained Howard's objection, admonished defense counsel and instructed the jury as follows: "When Howard hired a lawyer is not a subject for your consideration. You are to disregard that question." The trial court denied Howard's motion for a mistrial based on this issue.

The jury eventually returned a verdict in Howard's favor, but awarded him only about half of the damages he was seeking.

Continue reading "Court Defends Right to Lawyer in Florida Car Accident Cases - Howard v. Palmer" »

As we have mentioned in previous posts, the issue of liability in a Florida car accident often extends beyond the drivers involved to include third parties like manufacturers and, as the Fourth District Court of Appeal explains in Carroll Air Systems v. Greenbaum, a negligent driver's employer.

Ms. Greenbaum's son was killed in a 1985 car accident outside of Ft. Lauderdale when the car in which he was riding was struck by a vehicle driven by John Mills. Mills' car was traveling at somewhere between 86 and 97 miles in a 45 mile per hour zone at the time and ran a stop sign when the crash occurred.

Mills was on his way home to Plantation after attending a dinner dance related to a regional meeting of the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE). Mills and a number of other Carroll Air Systems salesmen, whose expenses were paid by the company, attended the three-day meeting as well as the dinner. He was drinking with colleagues and clients on the night of the accident and his blood alcohol content "was consistent with having consumed between eight and thirteen one-ounce drinks," according to the court.

Mills was convicted of criminal charges related to the accident and sentenced to jail time. Greenbaum sued Carroll Air, alleging that the company was vicariously liable for the accident because it encouraged its salesmen to drink with clients and knew or should have known that Mills was drunk and shouldn't have been driving on the night in question. All of the other Carroll Air employees attending the meeting stayed at a hotel on site, while Mills opted to stay at his home. After trial, a jury sided with Greenbaum, finding the company liable for $880,000 in compensatory ($80,000) and punitive ($800,000) damages.

The Fourth District affirmed the decision on appeal, finding ample evidence that Mills was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the fatal accident. "Carroll Air told its employees to attend ASHRAE functions because of their business benefits, and several company employees were at this particular regional meeting, including Mr. Carroll, the president," the court explained. In addition to paying his expenses for the meeting, the company also covered car expenses, such as mileage. Finally, the company encouraged social interaction at meetings and the like as an integral part of obtaining and keeping clients. The company even deducted drink purchases as business expenses.

Continue reading "Court Affirms Company Liability for Employee's Fatal Drunk Driving Crash - Carroll Air Systems v. Greenbaum" »

In Ortiz v. Regalado, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal takes on an important car accident litigation issue: the liability of a car co-owner when the vehicle is involved in an accident while being driven by its other owner.

The case stemmed from a fatal car accident in which a vehicle driven by Andy collided with a car driven by Lourdes, killing one of three of Lourdes' children who were passengers in the car. Andy's father, D.C., shared with Andy title to the car involved in the accident. Lourdes and her husband filed a lawsuit, claiming that Andy was negligent in causing the accident and that D.C. was vicariously liable as joint owner of the car.

Following trial, a jury found that Andy and Lourdes were each 50 percent negligent. Under Florida's comparative negligence system, a person who is injured partly due to his or her own negligence can hold another party liable proportionately. As a result, the trial court ordered Andy and D.C. to pay half of the more than $1.4 million in damages awarded for Regalado and her children. The court also ordered Andy and D.C. to pay the entire amount of a $1 million award for past and future pain and suffering to Lourdes' husband, Misael.

On appeal, however, the Second District overturned the order to the extent it required Andy and D.C. to pay the entire amount of Misael's damages award. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2006) provides that when two or more persons are jointly liable for the same injury to a person and one of the liable parties pays more than his share, that party is entitled to pro rata contribution from the other. The appeals court remanded the case back to the trial court to consider the contribution issue.

The Court nevertheless rejected D.C.'s claim that, as a co-owner of the car who was not directly involved in the accident, he was entitled to a limitation of damages under section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (2006). As the Court explained, the law "sets a limit on damages for which an owner of a vehicle is responsible when the owner loans the vehicle to another whose negligent operation of the vehicle results in damages to another." In this case, however, D.C. did not loan the car to Andy. Instead, Andy was lawfully driving the vehicle as its joint owner. "An owner of an object can only loan that object to another who has no legal right to the object," the Court observed.

Continue reading "Court Takes on Co-Owner Liability in Florida Car Accident Case - Ortiz v. Regalado" »

In Small v. Ford Motor Company, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida explains that a plaintiff in a Florida car accident case can't add defendants after suing simply for the purpose of defeating a federal court's jurisdiction.

The suit was brought on behalf of Ms. Small, who was injured in a rollover car accident on June 20, 2011 when she was ejected from a Ford Explorer in which she had been riding as a passenger. She sued Ford Motor Company, the car's manufacturer, and seatbelt maker Breed Technologies in state court, claiming that she was injured due to deficiencies in the car's restraint system, suspension and interior components as well as the rear panel and glass. The Defendants later removed the case to federal court in the Southern District on diversity grounds: the parties are residents of different states.

In a bit of legal wrangling, the Plaintiff later sought to amend her complaint to add South Florida Auto Auction of Fort Lauderdale - the dealership that sold the used car to the owner, who was driving at the time of accident - as a defendant. She also argued that the action should be remanded to state court because the addition of SFAAFL destroyed the complete diversity necessary for federal jurisdiction in this case. In order for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction based on diversity, each party must be from a different state than the other. Ford and Breed opposed the motion to amend, claiming it was meritless and intended solely to force the court to send the case back to state court.

The Southern District sided with the Defendants, denying the motions to amend and remand. "In deciding whether to permit or deny joinder, the district court must balance the defendant's interests in maintaining the federal forum with the competing interests of not having parallel lawsuits," the court explained.

In this case, the court said that the timing of the motion to amend - immediately after the matter was removed from state to federal court - strongly suggested that it was meant only to destroy federal jurisdiction. Although Plaintiff claimed that she had had trouble locating the car's seller, the court noted that she did not seek to add SFAAFL until more than a year after the accident happened.

Continue reading "Federal Court Retains Jurisdiction in Single-Car Rollover Accident Case -Small v. Ford Motor Company" »